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CHAPTER 4

Contracts
FREDERICK M. HART

§4.1. Introduction. It has often been argued that certainty is
desirable, if indeed not necessary, in that branch of the law which
adjusts rights in commercial disputes. Entrepreneurs have the responsibility of weighing business risks, but, as far as possible, they
should be relieved of the danger that their commercial judgments may
be frustrated by some novel legal decision. There is another attractive
attribute of certainty which appeals to some students of jurisprudence
- it has a tendency to decrease litigation. Where the law clearly
defines rights and liabilities, the commercial community can adjust its
actions accordingly and disputes may often be settled by nonjudicial
means.
The Uniform Commercial Code and its predecessors, the uniform
acts, are prime examples of the attention given by lawmakers to
clarifying the law in the commercial area. Judicial handling of
commercial cases often evidences the same interest in providing
established guidelines for the businessman. Stare decisis becomes a
stronger maxim. Equity, in the broad sense of the term, is gently
shoved behind a billboard advocating strict use of rules and principles
so that the pure, albeit intricate, system that ties together the transactions of the business world may be assembled as pieces that are
interlocked in a jigsaw puzzle. Each individual part, no matter how
queerly shaped, goes to make the whole. The completed scene is the
end to be attained, the parts individually having limited value and
scant beauty.
But the picture is never quite complete. Imagination can indicate
what it is supposed to look like since most of the pieces are in place or are they? Has not there been a mistake? That piece there, right in
the middle, which looks like consideration, certainly is correctly placed.
Yet here is another of similar shape and dimension but appearing
to be promissory estoppel. Certainly one can be substituted for the
other. And glance at that corner over there: the pieces obviously
must lie side by side but they do not fit together. The convex side of
one meets the protrusions of the other so that the assembler must allow
one to overlap the other. But which one is to be placed atop?
FREDERICK M. HART is Associate Professor at Boston College Law School and a
member of the District of Columbia and New York Ban. He is a recompilation
editor of Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.).
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During the 1961 SURVEY year the courts of l\fassachusetts dutifully
performed their task of settling commercial contro,·ersies. Of those
that reached the Supreme Judicial Court none indicate any strong
trends nor are there any decisions which have the likelihood of being
regarded as landmarks in the law. Still several are interesting enough
to report herein. Some haw added certainty to the law; others dealt
with issues previously doubtful without shedding appreciable light
on the judicial attitude in relation to their solution. Neither individually nor collectiwly do the cases resolve the fundamental
question of contract law: Should the law shape and mold business
acth·ity or should it be content with attempting to assist parties in
attaining their reasonable expectations?
§4.2. Output contracts: Discontinuance of business: Good faith.
Output and requirements contracts have successfully weathered various
attacks and gained general acceptance as enforceable agreements. 1
They are specifically recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code,2
which provides that the rights and duties of the parties are to be
governed largely by the elastic concept of good faith. Under the code
provision the terms of the contract are still the preponderating
determinant of the parties' obligations, but where the action of the
promisor or promisee prevents the other party from realizing on his
reasonable expectations, liability will result unless the action was
taken in good faith.s The workability of the good faith test is
evidenced by its successful application in numerous pre-code cases. 4
An example of its use, in the context of a particular problem inherent
in all output and requirement contracts, is found in Neofotistos v.
Harvard Brewing Co.,5 which was decided during the 1961 SURVEY
year.
The plaintiff in this action agreed to purchase, and the defendant
to sell, all of the spent grain resulting from the defendant's production
of malt beverages at its Lowell plant. The contract extended over a
5.ve-year period, and the price was to be determined bimonthly by an
agreed method but in no case was to be less than a stated minimum.
'Jfhe contract was performed from its inception in May of 1955 until
November of 1956. At this time the defendant ceased the production
of malt beverages because, in its judgment, their manufacture had
become unprofitab1e.6 Subsequently the business was sold, but the
§4.2. 1 See Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 Ill.
L. Rev. l (1932).
2 Uniform Commercial Code §2-306, G.L., c. 106, §2-306.
a See Note, Requirements Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 102
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 654 (1954).
4 See Mass. Code Comment to G.L., c. 106, §2-306; l Williston, Contracts §104(a)
(!Id ed. 1957).
5 341 Mass. 684, 171 N.E.2d 865 (1961).
6 It was stipulated that for the year ending September 30, 1955, defendant had an
operating loss of SI63,142.55 and a net loss of SI 84,582.43. For the year ending
September 30, 1956, the operating loss was $183,900.60 and the net loss was $267,502.12. Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 685, 171 N.E.2d 865,
866 (1961).
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Lowell plant was not reopened by the purchaser. The plaintiff,
alleging breach of contract, sued and recovered a jury verdict. The
Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict should have been granted and ordered judgment entered for
the defendant.
In its opinion the Court discusses three prior Massachusetts cases:
Proctor v. Union Coal Co.,1 Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Union St. Ry., 8
and McNally v. Srhell. 9 The significance of the Neofotistos decision is
better understood if viewed in the light of these decisions.
In Proctor v. Union Coal Co., 10 the plaintiff sold land to the defendant. As part of the sales agreement the defendant promised to
furnish ice from a pond on the land as required by the plaintiff for his
home and business. When the land was subsequently resold and the
plaintiff was unable to procure ice from the pond, suit was brought
on the contract and the plaintiff was allowed to recover. To understand the dissimilarity between Proctor and Neofotistos, it should be
noted that the Proctor case involved a requirements contract while
the agreement in the Neofotistos case was for the defendant's output.
Although the two are similar in many ways, they also differ. In the
requirements contract the vendor's obligation is determined by the
needs of the vendee, while in the output contract the purchaser's
duty is measured by the production of the seller. Thus, in the requirements contract the vendor's obligation will vary depending upon the
action of the vencice who has the power and right to alter his requirements, at least within limits. The converse is true in the output
contract, as the vendee must take all of the vendor's goods.
In both the Proctor case, which involved a requirements contract,
and the Neofotistos case, which involved an output contract, the
defendant was the supplier. The distinction between the two cases is
obvious. In Proctor the defendant had no discretion whatever in the
amount of ice to be given to the plaintiff - he obligated himself to
supply all that the plaintiff required. In Neofotistos, however, the
quantum of the defendant's promise was to vary, under the express
terms of the contract, in response to decisions made by him subsequent
to the time the parties entered into the contract. It was for him to
decide the extent of his obligation by deciding how much malt beverage he should produce. The vital issue in Neofotistos, therefore, was
whether he could exercise his determinative power to its extreme by
producing nothing.
Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Union St. Ry. 11 was neither a requirements
nor output contract in the strict sense. The defendant, owner of
certain railroad freight facilities, entered into an agreement with the
plaintiff whereby they both were to share these facilities during a five7 243 Mass. 428, 137 N .E. 659 (1923).
s 269 Mass. 329, 168 N .E. 781 (1929).
o 293 Mass. 356, 199 N .E. 748 (1936).
10 243 Mass. 428, 137 N.E. 659 (1923).
11 269 Mass. 329, 168 N .E. 781 (1929).
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year period. Either party had the right to revoke the agreement by
giving a six-month notice. The plaintiff gave notice and then im·
mediately discontinued freight operations, thereby eliminating its
need for use of the facilities. In a suit brought by the plaintiff for a
sum alleged to be the balance due under the contract while it was
actually performed, the defendant's answer set up, by way of recoupment, the allegation that plaintiff had breached its contract to use the
facilities.
The Court, holding that the plaintiff had failed to perform its
obligations under the contract, stated:
The defendant assumed the risk of the volume of the plaintiff's
business but did not assume the risk of its voluntarily giving up
that business. . . . The provisions of the contract, when interpreted in the light of the circumstances and purposes to be accomplished, mean that the plaintiff was under an obligation to
carry on a freight trolley business and not to stop the normal flow
of business. . . . The continuation of that business was essential
to the carrying out of the terms of the contract and hence an
agreement to that effect is implied. 12
Although the case did not involve an output contract, the tenor of the
opinion is opposed to the result in Neofotistos. There is no clear
theoretical distinction between the two cases. In both, performance
of the party sought to be charged was dependent upon his continued
operation of his business, but in one the Court found an implied
promise not to go out of business while in the other it did not.
The last case which the Court distinguished is McNally v. Schell,13
which also involved a contract that falls without the strict definitions
of output and requirements contracts. In this case the plaintiff was
hired to collect rents in a building owned by the defendant. The
plaintiff promised to perform this work for five years, but there was no
specific promise by the defendant to continue his employment for any
stated perioc! of tirue. Before the elapse of the five years, the defendant sold the building thereby making it impossible for the plaintiff
to perform under the contract. It is important to look at the issue as
posed by the Court: Was the agreement revocable at the pleasure of the
defendant? Holding that the plaintiff could recover damages under
the contract, the Court found an implied promise by the defendant
"not to disable the plaintiff from their performance of services." 14
Although the way in which the opinion is worded suggests that the
case has applicability to requirements and output contracts, in reality
it does not. The Court clearly, and correctly, considered the cases as
posing only the question of whether the contract of employment was
12 269 Mass. at 332, 168 N.E. at 782.
13293 Mass. 356, 199 N.E. 748 (1936).
14 293 Mass. at 360, 199 N.E. at 749.

1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW

46

§4.3

terminable at the will of the defendant. Once finding, from the
circumstances and terms of the agreement, that it was not, the method
by which the defendant breached his promise was immaterial.
The Court in Neofotistos distinguished the above three cases simply
on the ground that in each designated property was devoted to the
purposes of the contract and that "in the particular circumstances
a promise to hold the property for that use during the term of the
contract was implied." 15 In the Neofotistos contract the Court found
no agreement by the defendant to produce any specific amount of malt
beverages at the Lowell plant. Therefore, the Court concluded that:
Since there was no express obligation for the defendant to pro·
duce, there was no implied obligation to continue production.
The only implied promise that the plaintiff could reasonably
assume from the contract was that the defendant would carry out
its agreement in good faith and do nothing to interfere with
normal production.ta
Whether the Proctor, McNally, and Eastern Mass. St. Ry. cases are
easily distinguishable, the decision of the Court in Neofotistos is sound.
In accord with the prevailing majority rule, 17 it would also seem to be
in agreement with the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 s
One final comment should be made about the case and the extent
of its holding. The goods to be sold under the agreement, spent grain,
was a by-product of the seller's manufacturing process, and he ceased
production not because the manufacture of this by-product was unprofitable, but because the operation of his plant - the purpose of
which was to produce malt beverages -was showing a loss. 19 The case
should be restricted to similar facts and not extended to cover the
situation where the vendor ceases production of the product being
sold under an entire output contract because that contract has itself
proved a bad bargain for him. If, for instance, a contract were for
the entire output of a particular product and at a fixed price, and the
price of that product rose sharply during the term of the contract,
the seller should not be allowed to avoid the contract by ceasing
production. The risk of such an increase was a part of the bargain.20
§4.3. Postemployment obligations: Covenants not to compete. In
15

341 Mass. 684, 688, 171 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1961).

16 341 Mass. at 689, 171 N.E.2d at 868.
17 See l Williston, Contracts §l04A (3d ed. 1957).
18 Note, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 654, 659 (1954).
19 In the Neofotistos case the defendant seller apparently

protected himself against
such a bad bargain. The agreement provided for a sliding price scale. Neofotistos
v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 686, 171 N.E.2d 865, 866 (1961).
20 Cf. Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code §2-306: "A shut-down by a
requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permissible when a shut-down merely
to curtail losses would not."
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both 19591 and 19602 extensive articles appeared sun·eying the law
governing postemployment covenants which restrict an employee's
activities after the termination of the employment relationship. A
third was published in 1961.3 All suggested that the clang-er to an
employer of a trusted employee's disclosing trade secrets or misusing
confidential information has greatly increased under prevailing- labor
market conditions wherein movement of key personnel from one
company to a competitor is commonplace. As if to substantiate the
authors' concern, the Supreme Judicial Court considered three cases 4
during the 1961 SURVEY period which directly involve an employee's
obligations after termination of his employment contract. Another
case,11 although it arose from the sale of a business rather than an employment contract, had similar overtones.
Of these cases, New England Overall Co. v. JJ'oltma1111 6 produced
the longest and in some ways the most helpful opinion. The plaintiff
was a family corporation that had dealt for an extended period in a
specialized type of wearing apparel, the styles of which are important
and vary seasonally. There were two defendants: a salesman who had
been with the company for a number of years and a sales manager
who was the first person from outside the family to be trusted with
company secrets. The salesman originally worked under a written
contract requiring him to keep secret customer lists, prices, and other
matters pertaining to the business. At the time of his defection he
was on an oral year-to-year contract which the Court found to contain
like terms. The sales manager understood when he assumed his
position that he would keep inviolate trade and business secrets.
The defendants, while still in the employ of the plaintiff corporation, set up a competing company in conjunction with a third party.
A period of double-dealing followed until eventually both resigned
and began to compete openly. Customer lists were taken, information
relative to suppliers heretofore closely guarded by the corporation was
used by the new enterprise, and both customers and suppliers of the
plaintiff were solicited by the defendants on behalf of the new company. Suit was brought, which resulted in an award of damages and a
decree enjoining the defendants from soliciting or communicating
§4.3. 1 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1959);
Levin, Non-Competition Covenants in New England: Part I, 39 B.U.L. Rev. 482
(1959). See also Coleman and Cole, Effect of Shifting Employment in Trade Secrets,
14 Business L. 319 (1959).
2 Levin, Non-Competition Covenants in New England: Part II, 40 B.U.L. Rev.
210 (1960).
3 Von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1961).
4 American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen, 1961 l\fass. Adv. Sh.
1259, 178 N.E.2d 5; New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 1961 l\Iass. Adv. Sh.
1113, 176 N.E.2d 193; Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973,
175 N .E.2d 374.
5 Slate Co. v. Bikash, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1231. 177 N.E.2d 780. See also Bonneau
v. Meaney, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 178 N.E.2d 577.
61961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 176 N.E.2d 193, also noted in §5.4 infra.
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with customers in the New England states, New York, and Pennsylvania.
The principal contention of the defendants considered by the Court
was the argument that Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva 7 had established a rule for this jurisdiction that injunctive relief would be
granted an employer, in absence of an express contract, only in situations involving new or secret inventions and processes or knowledge of
special circumstances. In rejecting this interpretation of the Woolley's case, the Court stressed a part of that opinion 8 which indicates
that the deciding factor in such litigation is whether the knowledge or
information the use of which the employer is attempting to restrain is
confidential. Finding this to be the test, and that the information
used by the defendants was within this category, the Court upheld the
injunction.
The relief granted, a decree restraining the employees from soliciting
customers of their former employer, was the same that was denied in
the Woolley's case. It is interesting that in distinguishing the New
England Overall Co. case from it, reliance was not placed upon the
possible ground that there was here an express contract not to use
customer lists, but rather on the less definite concept that the information was confidential. Although the result reached by the Court
appears just, it is difficult to determine what criteria the Court used to
distinguish confidential from nonconfidential information. Perhaps
the Court was impressed with the fact that in the New England
o·verall Co. case it appeared that the information was not readily
available to the public and probably could not have been easily
obtained by one outside the corporation, whereas in Woolley's (which
involved a laundry routeman who solicited his former customers
after he went into business on his own) anyone could ascertain his
customers and pertinent facts about them by following him as he
covered his route. Or perhaps the manner in which the employer has
himself treated the information is significant; or again, the Court may
have been impressed with the value of the information to the business.
Assuming that the Court's specific reaffirmation of the Woolley's
decision and rationale9 adds to the stature of that opinion, the primary
importance of New England Overall Co. is its indication of how the
former opinion is to be read. Customer information is not to be
categorically denied protection in absence of a physical taking or
express contract. Whether such information is confidential is to be
the primary issue, and this will depend upon the facts of the case. It
!104 Mass. !18!1, 2!1 N.E.2d 899 (19!19).
"The questions to be determined in each case are whether the knowledge or
information, the use of which the employer seeks to enjoin, is confidential, and
whether, if it be confidential in whole or in part, its use ought to be prevented."
Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, !104 Mass. !18!1, !189, 2!1 N.E.2d 899, 902 (19!19).
9 The Court stated that "in rejecting the defendant's contentions, we reaffirm the
result and the reasoning of the Woolley's Laundry case." New England Overall
Co. v. Woltmann, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 1119, liG N.E.2d 19!1, 198. Cf. Case
Note, 29 Ky. L.J. 247 (1941).
7
8
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should be noted, however, that the New England Overall Co. case
discloses grossly improper activities by the defendants, some of which
did not directly relate to the acts restrained. Whether the injunction
would have been affirmed in absence of such conduct is to be seriously
doubted.
The definition of confidential information in this context was also
involved in American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen. 10
Here the defendant had been the president and a director of the
plaintiff corporation in which either he or his wife was a minority
stockholder. He was deposed as president and almost immediately
thereafter established a competing window cleaning service. Apparently impressed by the fact that this was a "business which could
not be conducted surreptitiously," 11 the Court held that the successful
solicitation of regular customers of his former employer did not
amount to grounds for recovery of damages. The Court said:
There is no basis . . . for a conclusion that the defendant used
confidential information in soliciting the plaintiff's regular customers. Remembered information as to plaintiff's prices, the
frequency of service, and the specific needs and habits of particular
customers was not confidential. 12
The Court then proceeded to make a fine distinction. The defendant had submitted a bid for regular service to one of the plaintiff's "irregular'' 13 customers prior to leaving the company. He had also prepared a revision of the bid which was submitted by another employee
before the defendant left. Immediately after being voted out as
president, the defendant went to this irregular customer, informed
him that he was establishing his own company, was shown a copy of
the revised bid by the customer, and was given a contract for the service
when he undercut the bid by a slight amount. This, the Court found,
was an actionable wrong entitling the plaintiff to damages. The
Court stated that the defendant had
appropriated to his own purposes his work done for the plaintiff.
While employed, he had established a pre-contract relationship
between the plaintiff and an irregular customer which in due
course was likely to ripen into a contract. Knowledge of this was
special corporate information. Interference with that relationship, immediately upon discharge . . . and with the use of
plaintiff's bid, . . . was unfair. [Defendant], in the circumstances,
in using the plaintiff's figures as his own, stood little better than
if he had used a copy of the figures carried away by him. 14
101961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1259, 178 N.E.2d 5.
111961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261, 178 N.E.2d at 7.
12 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262, 178 N.E.2d at 8.
13 A customer for whom work had been done two or three times during the pre·
vious five years.
14 American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1259, 1264, 178 N .E.2d 5, 9.
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Admitting, as the Court does,111 that if the defendant had not been
in the employ of the plaintiff he would have been free to use the figures
disclosed to him by the customer, the opinion furnishes few clues as to
why recovery was allowed. Several reasons may be surmised for the
Court's decision, but none is satisfactory. It may be argued, for
instance, that use of the calculations contained in the plaintiff's bid
was tantamount to a physical taking of the bid itself, but the same
should also be said for remembered information about customers'
habits and needs. Or the theory may be advanced that the work
done on the bid by the defendant became the "property" 18 of the
plaintiff and therefore could be used only by him, but such reasoning
applies with equal vigor to any beneficial contacts or good will
established by the employee during his tenure irrespective of whether
a firm contract or only a pre-contractual relation resulted.
Both New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann and American Window
Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen indicate that the Supreme Judicial
Court has a renewed interest in affording protection to that class of
knowledge gained by an employee during his tenure which the Court
categorizes as "confidential information." It is impossible to define or
delimit the term from the opinions in these two cases, and prior decisions of the Court afford little guidance. The distinguishing characteristic of the protected class of information seems to be its inaccessibility
to a competitor who has no inside connections. The American Window Cleaning Co. case demonstrates that this cannot be applied as a
rigid test but that it is at most a flexible guide.
The third case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the
past year in the postemployment area, Novelty Bias Binding Co. v.
Shevrin,11 presented entirely different issues. The defendant-employee
had been given access to confidential information during his nine
years with the plaintiff company. Over the years he had embezzled
in excess of $130,000 from the plaintiff, which led to his discharge and
the commencement of criminal proceedings against him. During the
criminal prosecution he agreed to restore the money taken and also
to refrain from competing with the plaintiff during the following
three years. · Subsequently, upon his violation of the agreement not
to compete, an injunction was granted restraining him from selling
articles, of the type produced by the plaintiff, during the three-year
period.
In attempting to reverse the decree, the defendant unsuccessfully
argued that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable because it was
not ancillary to an employment contract. Two separate and independent issues are raised by the defendant's contention: (1) whether
the policy favoring free competition is unduly and unreasonably curtailed by the restrictions, 18 and (2) whether the agreement ·not to
llilbid.
18 Cf. Di Angeles v. Scavzillo, 287 Mass. 29, 191 N.E. 426 (1934).
17 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 175 N.E.2d 374.
18 See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1959).
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compete was supported by sufficient consideration.ID Usually, courts
have placed little emphasis on the second of these issues. They have
either found that the restrictive covenant is ancillary and necessary to a
superior bargain between the parties and thus enforceable under the
Mitchel v. Reynolds20 doctrine, or they have found that the restrictive
covenant was not a subordinate part of a broader contract and hence
enforceable as an unreasonable restraint on trade. Where the covenant
has been found ancillary, consideration flowing from the main agreement is obviously present in most cases; where the covenant is not
ancillary, the courts have seldom reached the consideration question
since enforcement has been denied on the broader principle.
The defendant's agreement not to compete cannot be considered
ancillary to a contract with the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff and the
district attorney promise to forbear from prosecuting the criminal
case. However, as the Court holds, the restrictive covenant was ancillary to a permissible transaction: the defendant's agreement to make
restitution. The Court's decision that this is not an unreasonable
restraint of trade is sound. If the law, through the use of criminal
sanctions, could have incarcerated the defendant for his acts, it should
not be held that a lesser restraint is against the public policy favoring
free competition.
The Court's treatment of the applicable sections of the Restatement
of Contracts is, however, far from satisfactory. Section 515 provides
that, in the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or
economic justification, a restraint of trade is unreasonable and hence
unenforceable under Section 514 if it "is based on a promise to refrain
from competition and is not ancillary either to a contract for the
transfer of good-will or other subject of property or to an existing
employment or contract of employment."
It is clear that in the absence of social or economic justification the
covenant sued upon in the Novelty Bias Binding Co. case must be
held to be unenforceable if the Restatement is to be followed. The
Court, however, refuses to recognize this, and attempts to avoid the
section by referring to Comment a of the section, which reads in part:
. . . no implication is intended that all bargains that do not fall
within these rules are legal. They may or may not be. Section
516 states some bargains that are reasonable and therefore legal;
but there is a territory between the two Sections . . . which is
not covered by the rules stated in either section. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The Court finds that the covenant in the instant case is one which
falls within the lacuna between the two sections. Note what it does to
come to this conclusion. The first sentence of Comment a is distorted
to read that "no implication is intended that bargains that do fall
within this section are illegal." The Comment does not say this,
19 6

20

Corbin, Contracts §1395 (1951).
l P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
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and to infer that it means this is a glaring example of reverse logic.
And again, the Court, in holding that the covenant in the case falls
between Sections 515 and 516, must completely overlook the fact that
Section 515 specifically covers the situation. The Court would have
been on firmer ground, and would have averted possible confusion,
if it had simply rejected the Restatement rule as too narrow or had
clearly held that there was sufficient "social justification" for its result.
Although the consideration issue is not discussed as a separate
problem, the opinion hints at the fact that it may have troubled the
Court. After noting the plaintiff's right to recover the money stolen
in a civil action, and after inferring that the reparation agreement
was an important factor in the disposition of the criminal case, the
Court stated:
The defendant doubtless desired to avoid imprisonment; the
plaintiff obviously desired that the good will of the businesses be
protected from one who at liberty could do it immediate and
grievous harm. In the circumstances disclosed, we think consideration of public policy, equity and fair dealing favor enforcement
of the covenant if it is otherwise reasonable. 21
The conclusion of the Court appears correct, and the above statement is not objectionable if it is directed only to the question of
whether the restraint is illegal on the ground that it is opposed to
policy favoring free competition. However, since the above is phrased
in words of bargain and exchange, a danger arises that the inference
might be drawn that the Court is holding forbearance in the criminal
prosecution, either by the plaintiff or by the district attorney, to be
sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. Even in face
of the statutory encouragement given reparation agreements,22 the
stifling of a prosecution cannot constitute good consideration.2s It is
proper, however, to settle or to promise to forbear from prosecuting
a civil action even though this be intertwined with a criminal prosecution.24 It is the plaintiff's forbearance in the civil action, if anything,
that furnishes the consideration in the Novelty Bias Binding Co. case
for the defendant's promise not to compete.
The extent of the restriction in the case is also worthy of mention.
Originally, the covenant covered a twenty-eight state area in which the
plaintiff transacted business. This was narrowed to twenty-six states
by the trial court on the ground that in two of the states the amount
of business conducted by the plaintiff was negligible. The Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the decree in whole, reiterating its prior
21 Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 97!1, 976, 175 N.E.2d
!174, !176.
22 See G.L., c. 266, §61; id., c. 276, §92.
23 6 Corbin, Contracts §1421 (1951).
24 Ibid.
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S/atr Co. 11. Bikas/i, 26 the last case to he reported in this section, was
an action brought to enforce a restrictive cm·enant gi,·en in nmjunction with the sale of a business. Two of the defendants, Bikash and his
wife, owned and operated a wholesale candy and tobacco business
in the city of Quincy. Their son-in-law, Kaitz, had worked with them
until October of 1956 when, with their financial assistance, he purchased a similar business in Boston. In August of 1957 Bikash and
his wife sold their business to the plaintiff agreeing that they would
not "directly or indirectly . . . engage in the wholesale candy and
tobacco business . . . in a capacity where they will personally solicit,
directly or indirectly, retailers for the purpose of selling at wholesale
. . . nor do anything to the prejudice of the good will."
In September of 1957 Kaitz formed a new corporation and moved
his operations to Quincy. Previously, during July of that year, he had
offered employment to several employees of his father-in-law's company, telling them that he intended to change the location of his
business. After moving to Quincy, Kaitz was successful in soliciting
former customers of his father-in-law.
This action was brought on the ground that Bikash had violated
his restrictive covenant not to compete. The only specific act which
the plaintiff could prove in support of his case was that Bikash had
assisted his son-in-law at the time Kaitz moved to Quincy by signing
as a co-maker on a note given to secure additional capital for the new
enterprise. Finding that no publicity had been given to this transaction, and that Bikash had not used his business acumen in assisting
his son-in-law, the Court affirmed a decree adverse to the plaintiff.
The concatenated facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the
plaintiff definitely made a bad bargain in purchasing the business
from the Bikashes, and that the defendants may well have executed a
clever plan to sell the "good will" of their business while still passing
on the benefits of that good will to their son-in-law. However, the
decision of the Court is sound for it is difficult to see how, or even why,
relief should be granted under the facts proved by the plaintiff. There
was no violation of the covenant not to compete, nor did the Bikashes
themselves undermine the good will of the business. Unfortunately
for the plaintiff, the son-in-law was in a favorable position to compete,
but the possibility of someone's having such an advantage should have
been realized prior to the purchase.
§4.4. Notice of exercise of option. An option bears such a close
resemblance to an offer that it is often called simply an irrevocable
25 See New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N .E.2d 997
(1940). See also Bonneau v. Meaney, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 178 N.E.2d 577, which
held a covenant not to compete for twenty years reasonable.
261961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1231, 177 N.E.2d 780.
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offer. 1 Where the promisor has received consideration for his promise
not to revoke, it is said that he is disabled from withdrawing the
power of acceptance given to the offeree. Professor Corbin apparently
believes that the option may be more satisfactorily explained. He
looks upon the promisor's primary promise to do or refrain from doing
an action at the option holder's election as a contract from its very
inception, performan(:c of which is conditional upon the option
holder's proper exercise of his right.2 Under his view, no new contract
arises when the option is exercised, the option holder's election "merely
pushes an already existing contractual obligation one step further
along its way, turning the duty of [the party giving the option] that
was conditional . . . into a duty that is no longer so conditional." s
It may be argued that Professor Corbin's analysis is an interesting
theoretical observation which has a certain fascination for those
interested in legal gymnastics, but as a practical matter it is unimportant. But look for a moment at one of the cases decided during the
past year, Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank.4
The plaintiff, Cities Service, held an option to purchase land which
it was leasing. The pertinent clause of the lease provided that the
"tenant shall have the option during the term of this lease . . . to
purchase . . . for the sum of $17,000 . . . payable as follows .. .
$200.00 on notice of intention to exercise this option . . . , [the option
to] be exercised by the tenant giving to the landlord written notice
of its intention to purchase . . . " 5 The lease terminated on September
I, 1959. On the evening of August 31, 1959, the plaintiff mailed
notice of its intent to exercise the option with a draft for $200 from its
New York City office. This arrived on September I and was promptly
returned.
The primary issue presented to the Court was whether the option
had been exercised during the term of the lease. This depended upon
whether the notice was effective when mailed or when received. The
Court, in holding that the notice was late, interpreted the terms of the
option to imply that notice and payment of the deposit were required
so that "the purchase and sale contract [would] have been completed
within the lease term." 6 This could have been accomplished, in the
§4.4. 1 Simpson, Contracts §20 (1954).
"[The promisor's] promise is from the very beginning a binding contract, his
duty to [perform] being conditional on notice by [the option holder] . . . The
sending of such notice ... is not merely the acceptance of an offer; it is also
the perfonnance of a condition precedent to [the] duty of immediate performance."
I Corbin, Contracts 873 (1950).
8 Id. at 875.
4 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961).
5 Ibid.
6342 Mass. at lll, 172 N.E.2d at 106. Although it is possible to interpret the
Court's opinion as holding that a formal purchase and sales agreement was required
during the term of the lease, see quote at note 11 infra, it is probable that the Court
meant that the giving of notice and payment of the $200 would have automatically
resulted in a sufficient contract if received during the term oI the lease.
2
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Court's opmton, by sending the notice and the deposit so as to be
receiwd before the expiration of the lease.
Keeping in mind the two views of an option, namely, as an irrevocable offer and as a conditional contract, it is both interesting and
beneficial to speculate on the approach taken by the Court in reaching
its decision, especially since the opinion is somewhat less than clear in
expressing the Court's rationale. Four avenues were available:
I. The general rule,• which may or may not apply in l\lassarhusetts,s
that an acceptance is effective upon mailing might have been rejected.
2. The acceptance upon posting rule could ha,·e been held inapplicable to option contracts on the ground that the rule is itself an
exception, and should not be extended to similar but different
situations.9
3. The Court could have adopted Professor Corbin's view of the
option and held that the conditions to the defendant's duty to convey
had not occurred.
4. The words of the option could have been examined to ascertain
the manifested intent of the parties and the conclusion drawn that they
had provided for the expiration of the option unless notice was
received while the lease was still operative.
The importance of ascertaining the approach of the Court is that
the case must take its place as authority in this jurisdiction. The
decision is certain, but the applicability of the decision will vary in
accord with the rationale applied by the Court. If the Court believed
that this was a simple case of offer and acceptance, the case could be
cited as a reaffirmation of McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co.10 On the other
hand, if either of the last two theories were adopted, the case has no
bearing on the time an acceptance of an offer becomes effective.
It appears that the Court, influenced perhaps by the Corbin concept
of the option, rested its decision on the ground that the words used
in the option require receipt of notice during the term of the lease. 11
7 Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. 8c Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); see 1 Williston,
Contracts §81 (3d ed. 1957).
8 Compare McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278 (Mass. 1822), with Brauer v.
Shaw, 168 ;\fass. 198, 46 N.E. 617 (1897).
9 See 3 Williston, Contracts §853 n.15 (rev. ed. 1936).
10 I Pick. 278 (Mass. 1822).
11 "The words in the gr:int of the option 'during the term of this lease or any
extension or renewal thereof' modify. we think, the words which follow them, that
is 'to purchase the real estate.' It is an 'option during the term . . . to purchase.'
The lease sets out the agreement that in the event of prescribed action during the
term of the lease there would arise a bilateral contract of purchase and sale. The
conditions for this contract arising are the giving of notice and the payment of $200
'on notice of intention to exercise this option.' Although the provisions as to the
5200 payment is not in the statement: 'This option shall be exercised by the Tenant
giving . . . written notice of its intention to purchase,' the requirement that the
payment be made 'on notice of intention' is express, and shows the intention to have
a purchase and sale agreement effective upon the down payment being made, in this
respect conforming to the usual practice in respect of agreements for the sale of
real property." Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108,
174 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1961).
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Thus it seems that the question of whether an acceptance is valid upon
posting is unaffected by this decision.
§4.5. General. Various reasons require careful selection of cases
for extended discussion in this SURVEY. Several decisions which were
not treated at length do appear worthy of mention.
Four such cases involved governmental contracts. In Essex-Lincoln
Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston,1 the Court denied a bill seeking rescission of a lease of a public parking facility where a change in the
direction of traffic on a one-way street resulted in a diminution of
business. The Court rejected the argument that continuance of the
traffic pattern was an implied condition of the lease on the ground
that the lease was detailed and indicated an attempt to express the
entire contract of the parties. Also rejected was the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of frustration should apply.
McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. School Building Committee of
Springfie[d2 reiterated the Court's prior position that G.L., c. 149,
§44H (which provides that sub-bids shall be rejected if incomplete)
should be interpreted reasonably in light of its purpose of protecting
the public. In this case a bid containing an obvious clerical error was
held acceptable.
Singarella v. City of Boston 8 raised the issue of whether approval of
a contract by the Mayor of Boston given before execution of the
contract was sufficient to satisfy Acts of 1890, c. 418, §6, as amended by
Acts of 1950, c. 216, §1.4 This statute requires the mayor's approval
of contracts made by city departments when the amount involved
exceeds $1000. The Court, in holding the prior approval sufficient,
relied upon a literal reading of the statute and the argument that the
mayor's duty to exercise his sound judgment and practical wisdom
might be fulfilled as well before as after the actual execution of the
contract so long as he had a full understanding of all of its terms.
Costonis v. Medford Housing Authority5 involved a contract which
provided that no change in its terms would be effective without
approval of the State Housing Board. In affirming a judgment for
additional expenses claimed by a modification of specification ordered
by a Government employee charged with administering the contract,
the Court held that the trial judge's finding that the employee had
apparent authority to agree to changes was not unreasonable.
D'Aloisio v. Morton's, Inc. 6 is basically a bailments case, but it has
value for the lawyer interested in contracts. The plaintiff left a fur
§4.5. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 979, 175 N.E.2d 466.
!141 Mass. 322, 169 N.E.2d 741 (1960).
s 342 Mass. 385, 173 N.E.2d 290 (1961).
4 The Court held that its decision would not be affected by either Acts of 1952,
c. 376, §1, or Acts of 1955, c. 60, §1. These statutes were not considered applicable
as no showing was made that they had been accepted by the city council. Singarella
v. City of Boston, 342 Mass. 385, 387 n.l, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 n.l (1961).
5 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 176 N.E.2d 25.
6 342 Mass. 231, 172 N.E.2d 819 (1961).
2
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coat with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant for storage and
repair. She could not herself read English, but was accompanied by
her daughter, a college student, who acted for her. When she deposited the coat, the plaintiff signed a document clearly marked as a
"storage receipt and contract" which, on the reverse side, limite<l
the liability of the defendant to $300. The coat disappeared and
upon demand of its return the defendant tendered $300. The Court
held that the document was a contract, not merely a receipt; that
the plaintiff was bound by its terms, even if she had not read them, by
virtue of her daughter's understanding of their import; and that the
limitation applied to the defendant's liability for negligence as well
as its liability under the bailment contract. However, the limitation
was held not to affect the defendant's liability for conversion.

